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Abstract
International human rights law (IHRL) was established in the
aftermath of the Second World War to prevent a reoccur-
rence of the atrocities committed in the name of fascism.
Central to this aim was the recognition that out-groups are
particularly vulnerable to rights violations committed by the
in-group. Yet, it is increasingly apparent that out-groups are
still subject to a wide range of rights violations, including
those associated with mass atrocities. These rights violations
are facilitated by the dehumanisation of the out-group by
the in-group. Consequently, this article argues that the crea-
tion of IHRL treaties and corresponding monitoring mechan-
isms should be viewed as the first step towards protecting
out-groups from human rights violations. By adopting the
lens of dehumanisation, this article demonstrates that if
IHRL is to achieve its purpose, IHRL monitoring mechanisms
must recognise the connection between dehumanisation
and rights violations and develop a positive State obligation
to counter dehumanisation. The four treaties explored in
this article, the European Convention on Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities and the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all forms of Racial Discrimination, all establish posi-
tive State obligations to prevent hate speech and to foster
tolerant societies. These obligations should, in theory, allow
IHRL monitoring mechanisms to address dehumanisation.
However, their interpretation of the positive State obligation
to foster tolerant societies does not go far enough to coun-
ter unconscious dehumanisation and requires more detailed
elaboration.
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1 Introduction
International human rights law (IHRL) was established
in the aftermath of World War II with the aim of pre-
venting a reoccurrence of the atrocities committed in
the name of fascism. The need to protect the other from
rights violations committed by the majority was a cen-
tral concern of the drafters of IHRL treaties in the post-
War period and was recognised as key to preventing the
commission of future atrocities. It is no coincidence that
the first three IHRL treaties drafted under the auspices
of the United Nations addressed genocide, refugees and
racial discrimination, respectively.1 Yet it is increasingly
apparent that the mere existence of IHRL is insufficient
to prevent violations of the rights of minorities and that
mass atrocities including ethnic cleansing and genocide
have not been confined to history.
This article takes as its starting point that the creation of
IHRL treaties and corresponding monitoring mechan-
isms should be viewed as the first step towards protect-
ing the rights of out-groups. It argues that IHRL moni-
toring mechanisms must both recognise and seek to
address dehumanisation as a root cause of human rights
violations, if IHRL is to achieve its purpose. Thus, they
must develop the preventative part of their mandates
and elaborate a positive obligation for States to disrupt
the process of dehumanisation and change societal atti-
tudes towards out-groups.
The term ‘out-group’ is used in this article as a catch-all
term to denote a group bound by a common identity,
distinct from that of the majority – in-group –
population, that is used as a pretext for the commission
of rights violations.2 While it is human nature for
members of in-groups to stereotype or be prejudiced
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277; Convention relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, 14 December 1950, 189 UNTS 150; International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (hereinafter ICERD).
2. This includes ethnic, linguistic or religious and national minorities, as
recognised in international minority rights law, but also encompasses
other groups that may be identified as ‘other’ by the in-group such as
sexual minorities (sexual orientation or gender identity), persons with
disabilities, migrants, refugees and political minorities. It is not relevant
for the purposes of this article if the societal out-group self-identifies on
the basis of this identity, as long as the in-group views the out-group as
‘other’ and this has the potential to result in human rights violations.
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towards out-groups,3 this becomes problematic when it
is used to legitimise the ill-treatment of these out-
groups, particularly at a societal level. The concept of
dehumanisation (and infrahumanisation) has been
developed within social psychology, and the associated
field of genocide studies, in order to explain the social
process that underpins the commission of harm against
out-groups. In contrast, concepts such as prejudice,
stereotyping and intolerance, which are perhaps more
familiar to a legal audience, form just one stage in the
process of dehumanisation. The concept of dehumanisa-
tion has, further, informed academic literature that has
explored how these social processes can be countered or
prevented in practice. Thus, the conceptual framework
provided by dehumanisation allows this article to expose
the social processes that legitimise human rights abuses
and reveal how these processes can be countered
through the elaboration of a positive State obligation.
IHRL scholarship has not previously engaged in detail
with the insights provided by social psychology, and
related fields, in relation to the process of dehumanisa-
tion. By adopting the lens of dehumanisation, this art-
icle sheds new light on why the IHRL project has not
been able to achieve its stated aim of protecting out-
groups from rights violations and how the current
IHRL framework can be repurposed and reframed to
address dehumanisation as the root cause of these rights
violations.
In order to provide a comprehensive picture of current
IHRL practice, this article explores four IHRL treaties,
and the practice of their respective monitoring bodies in
relation to European States. The European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR)4 and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 are general-
ly applicable instruments that seek to prevent a range of
rights violations, including those most obviously
connected to mass atrocities, such as the right to life and
the prohibition of torture. In contrast, the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
(FCNM)6 and the International Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD) are targeted instruments, which seek to pro-
tect the rights of out-groups. The mandates and work-
ing practices of each instrument’s monitoring mecha-
nism notably impact their ability to address dehumani-
sation as a root cause of rights violations. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) serves an entirely
judicial function, whereas the Advisory Committee to
the FCNM (AC-FCNM) is limited to a State reporting
process and issuing interpretative guidance in the form
of Thematic Commentaries. In contrast, the two treaty
3. See further, I. Tourkochoriti, ‘How Far Should the State Go to Counter
Prejudice? On the Legitimacy of the Role of the State to Change Hearts
and Minds’, in this special edition.
4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (hereinafter ECHR).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966,
999 UNTS 171 (hereinafter ICCPR).
6. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 Feb-
ruary 1995, CETS No 157 (hereinafter FCNM).
bodies, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) and the Human Rights Com-
mittee (HRC), consider State reports, issue interpreta-
tive guidance through General Recommendations/
Comments and serve a quasi-judicial function. None-
theless, this article asserts that it is possible for all four
mechanisms considered here to establish and elaborate a
positive State obligation to counter dehumanisation,
albeit to varying degrees.
Following this introduction, Section 2 of this article
draws on literature from Social Psychology and Geno-
cide Studies in order to introduce the concept of dehu-
manisation and demonstrate how dehumanisation
impacts the realisation of rights. Section 3 explores
whether it is possible for IHRL to be interpreted to
imply a positive State obligation to counter or prevent
dehumanisation. Here it is revealed that pre-existing
positive State obligations to prevent hate (and other
forms of intolerant) speech and to create tolerant societ-
ies have the potential to address both implicit and
explicit dehumanisation. Sections 4 and 5 analyse
whether the current practice of IHRL monitoring
mechanisms is sufficient to respond to the threat posed
by dehumanisation to the human rights of out-groups.
Section 4 focuses on whether IHRL monitoring
mechanisms have sufficiently recognised that dehuman-
isation undermines the realisation of rights. Section 5
draws on Social Psychology, and related fields, to evalu-
ate whether current interpretations of the positive State
obligations identified in Section 3 are sufficient to pre-
vent or counter dehumanisation and to ascertain how
these interpretations can be strengthened in practice.
2 Dehumanisation as a Cause
of Rights Violations
Drawing on research from Social Psychology and Geno-
cide Studies, this section sets out the premise of this art-
icle: dehumanisation facilitates and legitimises the viola-
tion of the human rights of out-groups. Consequently, it
identifies the key characteristics of dehumanisation and
establishes the connection between dehumanisation and
human rights violations. Examples from the AC-
FCNM’s Opinions on States Reports are used to dem-
onstrate the contemporary relevance of dehumanisation
as a cause of human rights violations in Europe, specifi-
cally in relation to migrants, Muslims and Roma.
Dehumanisation, broadly defined, involves the categori-
sation of an out-group as lacking human characteristics.
Categorisation does not need to be overt and explicit; it
can also be unconscious and implicit.7 The process is
closely related to phenomena including prejudice, ster-
eotyping, othering and delegitimisation.8 Dehumanised
7. N. Haslam and S. Loughan, ‘Dehumanization and Infrahumanization’,
64 Annual Review of Psychology 399, at 405 (2014).
8. D. Bar-Tal, ‘Delegitimization: The Extreme Case of Stereotyping’, in D.
Bar-Tal, C.F. Grauman, A. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (eds.), Stereotyping
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groups may be likened to animals, diseases9 or ‘superhu-
man creatures such as demons, monsters, and satans’.10
In less blatant forms of dehumanisation, the humanity
of the out-group may not be denied outright. Instead
the out-group will be categorised as less human than the
in-group or as having undesirable characteristics (infra-
humanisation).11 Notably, dehumanisation is observed
primarily in relation to ‘low-status/disadvantaged tar-
gets’.12
Both blatant and less blatant forms of dehumanisation of
out-groups, which fall into the category of ‘low-status/
disadvantaged’, can be observed in Europe. For
example, in the United Kingdom, the description of
migrants as cockroaches in a tabloid newspaper was sin-
gled out for criticism by the HRC.13 The AC-FCNM
has criticised the portrayal of Roma as ‘inadaptable’,14
‘asocial’,15 ‘lazy’16 and ‘criminal’,17 all of which suggest
infrahumanisation. While these are all human character-
istics, infrahumanisation results in these characteristics
being attributed to the entire out-group rather than to
individuals belonging to the out-group. Specifically,
such classifications may lead an out-group to be per-
ceived as being ‘outside the boundaries of the commonly
accepted groups, and … thus excluded from the
society’.18 Accordingly, the AC-FCNM has expressed
concern that the instrumentalisation of xenophobia by
political parties has led to the stratification of society in
Cyprus:
members of the predominant Greek Cypriot linguis-
tic and religious community are viewed as “first class
citizens”, EU citizens and wealthy immigrants are
regarded as coming second, and Turkish Cypriots,
Roma, refugees and asylum-seekers are considered as
falling into a third category.19
Here, the latter category is viewed as less human than
the first two categories and, therefore, as excluded from
society. Similar exclusion from society has been
observed by the AC-FCNM in relation to Roma, who
are frequently subject to ‘social rejection’ and viewed as
and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions (1989) 169, at 169. See further,
Tourkochoriti, above n. 3.
9. Bar-Tal, above n. 8, at 172; N.S. Kteily and E. Bruneau, ‘Darker Demons
of Our Nature: The Need to (Re)Focus Attention on Blatant Forms of
Dehumanization’, 26 Current Directions in Psychological Science 487,
at 488 (2017).
10. Bar-Tal, above n. 8, at 172.
11. Haslam and Loughnan, above n. 7, at 405.
12. Kteily and Bruneau, above n. 9, at 488.
13. HRC, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN doc.
CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 (2015), at para. 10.
14. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on the Czech Republic adopted on
16 November 2015 ACFC/OP/IV(2015)004, at para. 53.
15. Ibid.
16. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on the Slovak Republic adopted on
3 December 2014 ACFC/OP/IV(2014)004, at para. 35.
17. Ibid.
18. Bar-Tal, above n. 8, at 171.
19. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Cyprus adopted on 18 March 2015
ACFC/OP/IV(2015)001, at para. 34.
‘foreigners’,20 and, in the Netherlands, where younger
Muslims have reported feeling that ‘they are seen as
members of an ethnic and religious group first and citi-
zens of the Netherlands second’.21
While for Bar-Tal, dehumanisation can occur in ‘any
context of intergroup relations: international, interreli-
gious, intercultural, or interideological’,22 it appears to
require facilitating factors, which support the construc-
tion of the out-group as a threat to the in-group.23
Thus, adverse societal conditions,24 a perceived conflict
of interests25 or the presence of conflict26 have been
identified as potential motivating factors behind dehu-
manisation. Again, this is borne out in Europe, where
migrants are currently blamed for a range of societal ills,
ranging from ‘the economic situation and high unem-
ployment’,27 to ‘austerity policies to public health and
security’.28 Language that portrays migrants as an ‘alien
invasion’,29 Roma as criminals30 and Muslims as terro-
rists31 serves to heighten the sense of threat.
The value of dehumanisation as a concept, for the pur-
poses of this article, derives from the social process it
reveals. This perception of threat combined with the
denial of the humanity of the victim out-group, allows
the in-group to legitimise and rationalise human rights
violations. As observed by Haslam and Loughnan
‘[d]ehumanization has also been shown to predict forms
of aggression that are perceived as reactive and retaliato-
ry – and often righteous – by the perpetrator’.32 Specifi-
cally, Bar-Tal suggests that dehumanisation reduces
prosocial and increases antisocial behaviour towards
out-groups.33 The reduction of prosocial behaviour, or
collective helping, has the potential to result in discrimi-
nation and reduce the mobility of dehumanised out-
groups34 on the basis that they are perceived ‘as less
worthy of help, forgiveness, and empathy’.35 In the case
of migrants in Hungary, the perceived threat posed by
immigrants to the State has been linked to a lack of sup-
port for the admission of asylum seekers.36
20. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Germany adopted on 19 March 2015
ACFC/OP/IV(2015)003, at para. 54.
21. AC-FCNM, Third Opinion on the Netherlands adopted on 6 March
2019 ACFC/OP/III(2019)003, at para. 55.
22. Bar-Tal, above n. 8, at 179.
23. Ibid., at 171.
24. S. Opotow, ‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction’, 46 Journal
of Social Issues 1, at 4 (1990).
25. J. Vaes, M.P. Paladino, L. Castelli, J.P. Leyens & A. Giovanazzi, ‘On the
Behavioral Consequences of Infrahumanization: The Implicit Role of
Uniquely Human Emotions in Intergroup Relations’, 85 Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 1016, at 1031 (2003).
26. Kteily and Bruneau, above n. 9, at 490.
27. AC-FCNM Cyprus, above n. 19, at para. 34.
28. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Italy adopted on 19 November 2015
ACFC/OP/IV(2015)006, at para. 58.
29. Ibid.
30. AC-FCNM Slovak Republic, above n. 16, at para. 35.
31. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Denmark adopted on 20 May 2014
ACFC/OP/IV(2014)001, at para. 64.
32. Haslam and Loughnan, above n. 7, at 415.
33. Ibid., at 414.
34. Opotow, above n. 24, at 9.
35. Haslam and Loughnan, above n. 7, at 416.
36. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Hungary adopted on 25 February 2016
ACFC/OP/IV(2016)003, at paras. 75-76.
7
Stephanie Eleanor Berry doi: 10.5553/ELR.000161 - ELR July 2020 | No. 3
In contrast, antisocial behaviour underpinned by the
dehumanisation of the out-group is likely to include acts
of aggression and punitive behaviours.37 Goff and others
suggest that ‘[d]ehumanization is a method by which
individuals and social groups are targeted for cruelty,
social degradation, and state-sanctioned violence’.38 As a
result, dehumanisation might underpin discrimination
or punitive criminal justice legislation.39 At the extreme
end of the scale, Kteily and Bruneau emphasise that
the depiction of groups such as Africans, Native
Americans, Tutsis, the Roma, and Jews (alongside
others) as apes, savages, or vermin not only accompa-
nied colonization, slavery, and extermination but
facilitated these atrocities.40
Significantly, for Stanton and Bar-Tal, dehumanisation
is one stage in a larger process that facilitates the com-
mission of mass atrocities.41
In the context of Europe, both violent and non-violent
anti-social behaviour has been observed by the AC-
FCNM. Specifically, the AC-FCNM has linked physi-
cal attacks against Roma in the UK and Italy,42 ‘[t]he
heinous fatal stabbing of an Eritrean man in Dresden’43
and ‘physical attacks… against local reception centres
for immigrants from the Middle East and Africa’44 in
Italy to prejudice in these societies. In Spain ‘persisting
discrimination against Roma in all fields of daily life,
including in private-law relations such as access to
goods and services, employment or housing’ has also
been linked to prejudice.45 Thus, the dehumanisation of
out-groups has the potential to result not only in discri-
mination and violations of identity rights but also in the
denial of core human rights found in the ECHR and
ICCPR, such as the right to life and the prohibition of
torture.
However, as the process of dehumanisation allows the
in-group to morally legitimise these extreme behaviours,
out-groups are frequently not recognised as victims of
rights violations or blamed for their own treatment.
Opotow explains, ‘[t]hose who are morally excluded are
perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving;
consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appro-
37. Haslam and Loughnan, above n. 7, at 415.
38. P.A. Goff, J.L. Eberhardt, M.J. Williams & M.C. Jackson, ‘Not Yet
Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contem-
porary Consequences’, 94 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
292, at 305 (2008).
39. Kteily and Bruneau, above n. 9, at 490. See further Opotow, above
n. 24, at 9.
40. Kteily and Bruneau, above n. 9, at 487, 490. See also Bar-Tal, above
n. 8, at 176.
41. D. Bar-Tal, ‘Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of
Conflict and Ethnocentrism’, 46 Journal of Social Issues 65 at 66
(1990); G.H. Stanton, ‘Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Pre-
vented?’, 6 Journal of Genocide Research 211, at 213-17 (2004).
42. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on the United Kingdom adopted on
25 May 2016 ACFC/OP/IV(2016)005, at para. 72; AC-FCNM Italy,
above n. 28, at para. 59.
43. AC-FCNM Germany, above n. 20, at para. 56.
44. AC-FCNM Italy, above n. 28, at para. 58.
45. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Spain adopted on 3 December 2014
ACFC/OP/IV(2014)003, at para. 40.
priate, or just’.46 This can also be observed in Europe,
where, for example, the AC-FCNM has expressed con-
cern that in the UK, ‘Gypsies and Travellers are often
portrayed as perpetrators and a “criminal” group rather
than as victims’,47 and in Spain that ‘large parts of
Spanish society do not recognise as unacceptable the
notion that individuals may be insulted or treated less
well because of their Roma ethnic origin’.48 Thus, dehu-
manisation is how the in-group not only rationalises
anti-social behaviour against out-groups but also allows
the in-group to deny that out-groups are the bearers of
rights in the first place.
Dehumanisation can occur at the individual, societal
and institutional levels. As a result, the potential human
rights violations that flow from dehumanisation can be
perpetrated by private individuals, acting alone or in
concert with others, or by societal institutions, including
organs of the State.49 Of particular concern in the Euro-
pean context is the institutionalisation of dehumanisa-
tion, within societal institutions such as the mainstream
media. This has the potential to have more far-reaching
consequences than individualised dehumanisation
‘because institutionalized harm occurs on a much larger
scale’.50 However, institutions are able to legitimise
harming out-groups only if dehumanisation has been
first normalised and accepted at an individual level.51 As
explained by Opotow, ‘[m]oral exclusion emerges and
gains momentum in a recursive cycle in which individu-
als and society modify each other’.52 Whereas, histori-
cally, negative portrayals of out-groups have frequently
been associated with far-right political parties and
extreme elements in Europe, IHRL monitoring
mechanisms have expressed concern at the adoption of
divisive and intolerant rhetoric by the mainstream press
and politicians.53 This has led dehumanisation to
become increasingly acceptable within European societ-
ies.54 As institutional, societal and individual dehumani-
sation interact and are mutually reinforcing, this has the
potential to gradually legitimise more extreme responses
to the perceived threat posed by out-groups.
Consequently, out-groups, including migrants, Mus-
lims and Roma, have been and continue to be dehuman-
ised in Europe. Dehumanisation requires, first, the cate-
gorisation, be it explicit or implicit, of the out-group as
46. Opotow, above n. 24, at 1.
47. AC-FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at para. 72.
48. AC-FCNM Spain, above n. 45, at para. 40.
49. Opotow, above n. 24, at 12.
50. Ibid., at 13.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., at 11.
53. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Croatia adopted on 18 November 2015
ACFC/OP/IV(2015)005rev, at para. 41; AC-FCNM United Kingdom,
above n. 42, at para. 73; HRC United Kingdom, above n. 13, at para.
10; HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of
Switzerland, UN doc. CCPR/C/CHE/CO/4 (2017), at para. 20; CERD,
Concluding observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-fifth
periodic reports of Hungary, UN doc. CERD/C/HUN/CO/18-25 (2019),
at para. 16; CERD, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-
third and twenty-fourth periodic reports of Norway, UN doc.
CERD/C/NOR/CO/23-24 (2019), at para. 12.
54. AC-FCNM the Netherlands, above n. 21, at para. 54.
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not human or less human than the in-group; second, the
perception that the out-group poses a threat or under-
mines the interests of the in-group; and, finally, that
these factors are used to legitimise interferences with
the rights of the out-group. Dehumanisation not only
facilitates discrimination and violations of identity rights
but, once institutionalised, has the potential to legitimise
widespread and coordinated rights violations by organs
of the State. In Europe, the dehumanisation of Roma
has long been institutionalised in Central Europe and
has legitimised discrimination, ethnic cleansing and
genocide.55 While the dehumanisation of migrants and
Muslims is less ingrained, it is increasingly institutional-
ised – most clearly, in Hungary.56 If IHRL law is to
achieve its purpose, then IHRL monitoring mechanisms
must recognise that dehumanisation underpins viola-
tions of the rights of these out-groups.
3 A Positive State Obligation
to Counter Dehumanisation
under IHRL
Dehumanisation is a social process that is reinforced by
interactions at an institutional, societal and individual
level. As identified earlier, prior to giving rise to rights
violations, dehumanisation requires the categorisation of
out-groups as not human or less human than the in-
group alongside the categorisation of out-groups as a
threat to the interests of the in-group. However, it is not
clear whether IHRL is equipped to counter the social
processes behind dehumanisation. While dehumanisa-
tion undermines the realisation of rights, the social pro-
cesses underpinning it are not necessarily rights viola-
tions in themselves, for example, the categorisation of
out-groups may be unconscious or unspoken. Thus, it is
not enough for IHRL to simply require that States
refrain from actively violating rights. If dehumanisation
is to be addressed, IHRL must require that States adopt
positive measures to disrupt the process of dehumanisa-
tion at a societal level. Specifically, they must seek to
change societal attitudes towards out-groups.
The existence of positive obligations derived from
IHRL treaties has been clearly established by their mon-
itoring mechanisms and in academic literature.57 Nota-
bly, within the UN system, States are under an obli-
gation not only to respect rights by not actively violating
them, but also to protect individuals from rights viola-
tions perpetrated by private actors. Specifically, the
55. C. Cahn, ‘CERD and Discrimination Against Roma’, in D. Keane and
A. Waughray (eds.) Fifty Years of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Living Instrument
(2017), at 107-108.
56. CERD Hungary, above n. 53, at para. 16; HRC, Concluding observa-
tions on the sixth periodic report of Hungary, UN doc.
CCPR/C/HUN/CO/6 (2018), at para. 17.
57. See generally, L. Lavrysen, Human Rights in a Positive State: Rethink-
ing the Relationship between Positive and Negative Obligations under
the European Convention on Human Rights (2016).
HRC’s General Comment No. 31 establishes that States
must ‘take appropriate measures or to exercise due dili-
gence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm
caused by such acts by private persons or entities’
[emphasis added].58 If States are ‘to prevent… the
harm’, then it follows that they must adopt measures to
challenge the root causes of this harm. This interpreta-
tion is supported by the UN’s ‘respect, protect, fulfil’
framework: the obligation to fulfil requires that States
proactively adopt measures to facilitate ‘the full realisa-
tion of rights’.59 Similarly, the ECtHR has emphasised
that ‘the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practi-
cal and effective’,60 in order to legitimise reading posi-
tive State obligations into the ECHR.61 As dehumanisa-
tion is a root cause of rights violations perpetrated
against out-groups, it follows that States must counter
or prevent dehumanisation in order to both protect out-
groups from private actors and fulfil their human rights
obligations by removing obstacles to the realisation of
rights.
However, the substance of States’ positive obligations
differs between instruments and between rights. As a
result, this section establishes the scope of States’ posi-
tive obligation to prevent or counter dehumanisation
under the ECHR, FCNM, ICCPR and ICERD. Nota-
bly, while an explicit obligation to counter or prevent
dehumanisation has not been recognised, all four instru-
ments establish two types of positive obligations that, in
combination, have the potential to serve the same pur-
pose: the obligation to prevent intolerant and/or hate
speech and the obligation to create tolerant societies.
The categorisation of out-groups as not human or less
human than the in-group is central to the process of
dehumanisation. While not all forms of categorisation
are explicit or overt, when they are, it is possible for
States to intervene by prohibiting forms of expression
that categorise the out-group. Article 6(2) FCNM and
Article 20(2) ICCPR both establish a positive obligation
for States to prevent ‘discrimination, hostility or vio-
lence’ motivated by the identity of the out-group. While
the ICCPR explicitly requires that incitement to such
acts ‘shall be prohibited by law’, the FCNM requires
that States ‘take appropriate measures to protect’, allow-
ing space for broader measures at a societal level to
address the root causes of hate speech. In contrast,
although ICERD does not expressly establish a positive
obligation to prevent hate speech, this obligation has
been read into the Convention by the CERD.62 Signifi-
cantly, in elaborating the content of this positive obli-
gation, all three bodies have focused on ensuring the
58. HRC, General Comment No. 31 on The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), at para. 8.
59. Lavrysen, above n. 57, at 12; Committee on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12 on The right to adequate
food (art. 11), UN doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), at para. 15.
60. Airey v. Ireland, ECHR (1979) Series A. No. 32, at para. 24.
61. Lavrysen, above n. 57, at 6.
62. CERD, General recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate
speech, UN doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013).
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accountability of perpetrators of hate speech, hate
crimes or discrimination, through appropriate legal
frameworks, prosecution and punishment.63
The ECHR does not contain a provision that expressly
requires that States adopt positive measures to give
effect to their rights obligations. However, in practice,
the ECtHR has pointed to Article 1 ECHR, which
requires that States ‘secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ [emphasis added],
in conjunction with substantive convention rights as the
basis of positive obligations.64 While the ECtHR initial-
ly focused on legislative change when elaborating the
content of States’ positive obligations under the Con-
vention,65 it has increasingly read a variety of positive
obligations into almost all of the Convention rights.66
Thus, although no express obligation to prevent hate
speech exists in the ECHR, the ECtHR has established
that
as a matter of principle it may be considered necessa-
ry in certain democratic societies to sanction or even
prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite,
promote or justify hatred based on intolerance.67
Further, in the case of Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, while the
ECtHR accepted that an appropriate legal framework
existed, the failure to investigate instances of hate
speech that incited violence against a religious commun-
ity amounted to a violation of Article 9 ECHR.68 Thus,
a positive obligation exists under the ECHR for States
to ensure not only that hate speech is prohibited in law
but also that this law is implemented in practice.
These positive obligations have the potential to both
protect out-groups from rights violations perpetrated by
individuals and prevent additional violations that are
legitimised by the explicit dehumanising portrayal of the
out-group. However, legal regulation alone is insuffi-
cient to address the societal causes of rights violations.69
63. AC-FCNM, Fifth Opinion on Finland adopted on 27 June 2019
ACFC/OP/V(2019)001, at para. 105; AC-FCNM Hungary, above n. 36,
at para. 103; HRC, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report
of the Netherlands, UN doc. CCPR/C/NLD/CO/5 (2018), at para 16(c);
HRC, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, UN doc. CCPR/C/BIH/CO/3 (2017), at para. 22;
CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para. 9;
CERD, Concluding observations on the combined second to fifth peri-
odic reports of Serbia, UN doc. CERD/C/SRB/CO/2-5 (2018), at
para. 14.
64. Assenov v. Bulgaria, ECHR (1998) Reports 1998-VIII, at para. 102; Vgt
Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, ECHR (2001) Reports 2001-
VI, at para. 45; Assanidzé v. Georgia, ECHR (2004) Reports 2004-II, at
para. 182. See further, J.-F. Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations Under
the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implemen-
tation of the European Convention on Human Rights (2007), at 8-9.
65. M. Bossuyt, International Human Rights Protection: Balanced, Critical,
Realistic (2018), at 139.
66. Lavrysen, above n. 57, at 60.
67. Erbakan v. Turkey, ECHR (2006) Application no. 59405/00, at para. 56.
Translation from ECtHR, Factsheet on Hate Speech, February 2020,
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf.
68. Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2015) Application no. 30587/13, at
para. 110.
69. See further, A. Böcker, ‘Can Non-discrimination Law Change Hearts
and Minds?’, in this special edition.
Significantly, while all four bodies have focused on the
legal prohibition of hate speech, they have also sug-
gested that States are under a positive obligation to
attempt to address the societal root causes of such
speech. Thus, the AC-FCNM, CERD and HRC have
all advised that States should introduce ‘awareness-rais-
ing campaigns’, as part of their strategy to address hate
and other forms of intolerant speech.70 Similarly, in
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR established
that
the authorities must use all available means to combat
racism and racist violence, thereby reinforcing demo-
cracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not
perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment
[emphasis added].71
Thus, it appears that a positive obligation exists under
the ECHR, FCNM, ICCPR and ICERD for States to
adopt not only legal measures to prohibit hate speech
but also non-legal measures to counter the societal atti-
tudes that underpin such hate speech.
However, the categorisation that underpins dehumani-
sation is not always articulated through speech. Stereo-
types may be so ingrained that they no longer require
articulation.72 Further, implicit or even unconscious
forms of categorisation may legitimise structural discri-
mination or undermine the realisation of the rights of
out-groups.73 If implicit categorisation is to be
addressed, then measures are required to challenge soci-
etal attitudes towards out-groups, more generally. Sig-
nificantly, under all four instruments, States are also
under a general obligation to create tolerant societies.
For example, Article 6(1) FCNM requires that States
parties ‘encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural
dialogue’ and ‘take effective measures to promote mutual
respect and understanding and co-operation among all
persons living on their territory’. In interpreting the
purpose of Article 6(1) FCNM, the AC-FCNM has
established that States should ‘enhance the majority
population’s openness towards diversity’,74 promote ‘an
overall positive attitude towards diversity and societal
integration’,75 and equip their populations ‘with the
knowledge and understanding to identify and combat
intolerance and prejudice’.76
70. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Sweden adopted on 22 June 2017
ACFC/OP/IV(2017)004, at para. 54; AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on
Switzerland adopted on 31 May 2018 ACFC/OP/IV(2018)003, at para.
64; CERD Norway, above n. 53, at para. 12(e); CERD, Concluding
observations on the combined twelfth and thirteenth periodic reports
of Czechia, UN doc. CERD/C/CZE/CO/12-13 (2019), at para. 11(b);
HRC the Netherlands, above n. 63, at para. 16; HRC United Kingdom,
above n. 13, at para. 10.
71. Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2005) Reports 2005-VII, at
para. 145.
72. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams & Jackson, above n. 38, at 304-306.
73. Ibid., at 305; Kteily and Bruneau, above n. 9, at 492.
74. AC-FCNM Croatia, above n. 53, at para. 46.
75. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Austria adopted on 14 October 2016
ACFC/OP/IV(2016)007, at para. 34.
76. AC-FCNM Germany, above n. 20, at para. 60.
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Similarly, Article 2 ICERD requires that States adopt
‘other means of eliminating barriers between races, and …
discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial
division’ [emphasis added]. Further, Article 7 ICERD
requires that States ‘adopt immediate and effective meas-
ures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education,
culture and information’ [emphasis added]. Notably, the
text of Article 7 ICERD not only requires that States
seek to change societal attitudes in order to counter
existing racial discrimination but also establishes that
such measures must be pre-emptive insofar as they must
be adopted ‘with a view to combating prejudices which
lead to racial discrimination’ [emphasis added]. Through
its Concluding Observations on State Reports, the
CERD has emphasised that the purpose of these provi-
sions is to ‘combat stereotypes’,77 ‘promote tolerance
and understanding…’78 and ‘address the root causes of
prejudices’.79
In contrast to the targeted instruments, the ICCPR does
not contain a provision that expressly requires that
States adopt positive measures to create tolerant societ-
ies. However, Article 2(2) ICCPR explicitly requires
that States ‘adopt such laws or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights’ [emphasis added].
This suggests that the drafters foresaw the need for
States to adopt a range of positive measures, beyond the
adoption of legislation, to give full effect to the provi-
sions of the treaty. The text of the preamble to the
ICCPR recognises that it is not enough for rights to be
enshrined in law, but that they ‘can only be achieved if
conditions are created’, suggesting that societal change
may be necessary if these rights are to be enjoyed in
practice. Further, Article 2(1) ICCPR requires that
States ‘undertake to respect and ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without dis-
tinction of any kind’. Here ‘ensure’ has been interpreted
by the HRC to require proactive steps by the State to
prevent human rights violations by private persons,80 an
interpretation that also aligns with the ‘respect, protect,
fulfil framework’.81 Through its practice, the HRC has
reaffirmed this interpretation by elaborating the content
of a positive obligation for States to address intolerance
77. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined fifth to ninth reports
of Ireland, UN doc. CERD/C/IRL/CO/5-9 (2019), at para. 24(b); CERD,
Concluding observations on the combined twentieth to twenty-second
periodic reports of Bulgaria, UN doc. CERD/C/BGR/CO/20-22 (2017),
at para. 20(c).
78. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-second to
twenty-fourth periodic reports of Poland, UN doc. CERD/C/POL/CO/
22-24 (2018), at para. 16(c); CERD, Concluding observations on the
twenty-third periodic report of Finland, UN doc. CERD/C/FIN/CO/23
(2017), at para. 23.
79. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined tenth and eleventh
periodic reports of the Republic of Moldova, UN doc.
CERD/C/MDA/CO/10-11 (2017), at para. 13(c).
80. HRC General Comment No. 31 (2004), above n. 58, at para. 8.
81. Although initially developed in relation to socio-economic rights, this
framework has subsequently been acknowledged to apply more gener-
ally. For example, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
General Comment No. 12, above n. 59, at para. 15; UN General
Assembly, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, UN doc. A/71/269 (2016), at para. 23.
and prejudice. Much like the AC-FCNM and CERD,
the HRC has required that States adopt positive meas-
ures to ‘promote tolerance and respect for diversity’, 82
‘respect for human rights’83 and to ‘eradicate stereotyp-
ing and discrimination’.84
Finally, while no explicit obligation to foster tolerant
societies exists under the ECHR, Lavrysen has identi-
fied a ‘cluster of cases … where the Court has imposed
obligations on the State under a variety of Convention
provisions to act as a guarantor of pluralism within
society’.85 Specifically, the ECtHR has recognised that
States have a positive obligation to address the societal
causes of rights violations, insofar as ‘[t]he role of the
authorities is not to remove the cause of tension by elim-
inating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing
groups tolerate each other’.86 Further, in S.A.S. v.
France, the ECtHR emphasised that the State ‘has a
duty … to promote tolerance’.87 This again suggests
that in order to discharge their duties under the ECHR,
States are under a positive obligation to adopt non-legal
measures to foster tolerant societies.
Under all four treaties considered here, a positive State
obligation to counter or prevent dehumanisation has not
been recognised. However, States are under a positive
obligation to adopt effective legal and societal measures
to prevent hate speech. This has the potential to reduce
dehumanisation, by limiting forms of expression that
overtly categorise out-groups and by signalling that such
categorisation is unacceptable at a societal level. Fur-
ther, the obligation to take measures to foster tolerant
societies establishes an obligation for States to address
the root causes of intolerance, including implicit or
unconscious forms of categorisation.
These positive obligations are more clearly articulated in
the text of some instruments than others. Further, the
mandates of their respective monitoring bodies have
impacted their ability to elaborate positive State obliga-
tions. Through the State reporting processes as well as
the adoption of General Comments or Thematic Com-
mentaries, the AC-FCNM, CERD and HRC have been
able to elaborate the measures that States are required to
take in order to prevent rights violations. In contrast, as a
court, the ECtHR is limited to hearing the facts of the
case before it, after the alleged violation has occurred.
As a result, it does not serve the same preventative func-
tion as the other mechanisms considered here. Nonethe-
less, the two identified positive obligations allow all four
mechanisms to require that States adopt measures to
82. HRC Hungary, above n. 56, at para. 18; HRC, Concluding observations
on the sixth periodic report of Italy, UN doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6
(2017), at para. 13.
83. HRC, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Swe-
den, UN doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/7 (2016), at para. 17; HRC United
Kingdom, above n. 13, at para. 10(b).
84. HRC Hungary, above n. 56, at para. 18; HRC Sweden, above n. 83, at
para. 17.
85. Lavrysen, above n. 57, at 94.
86. Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, ECHR
(2004) Application No. 39023/97, at para. 96.
87. S.A.S. v. France, ECHR (2014) Reports 2014, at para. 149.
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address dehumanisation as a root cause of rights viola-
tions, albeit to varying degrees.
4 Recognising Dehumanisation
as a Cause of Rights
Violations in Practice
This article has identified that under IHRL, States are
under a positive obligation to both address hate speech
and create tolerant societies. This should allow IHRL
monitoring mechanisms to not only require that States
counter dehumanisation but to also elaborate the con-
tent of this obligation, through their monitoring prac-
tice. However, if they are to do so, these mechanisms
must first recognise that dehumanisation undermines
the realisation of rights. While these mechanisms have
not expressly engaged with dehumanisation as a con-
cept, it is possible to ascertain the extent to which they
have engaged with the factors that contribute to dehu-
manisation. This section thus focuses on the extent to
which the AC-FCNM, CERD, ECtHR and HRC have
expressed concern about the explicit categorisation of
out-groups through hate speech and related phenomena
such as prejudice, intolerance and stereotyping as well
as the explicit portrayal of the out-group as a threat.
Further, the extent to which these mechanisms have
connected the categorisation of out-groups, including
implicit and unconscious categorisation, to other human
rights violations reveals whether they recognise dehu-
manisation to be a cause of rights violations. The prac-
tice of these mechanisms is again illustrated with refer-
ence to the situation of migrants, Muslims and Roma in
Europe.
As has been illustrated earlier, the AC-FCNM has con-
sistently expressed concern at the treatment of migrants,
Muslims and Roma in Europe. It has explicitly identi-
fied discourse that stigmatises or stereotypes minorities
as problematic88 and has expressed concern at the
increased acceptability of xenophobic discourse89 and
the role of mainstream media and politicians ‘in spread-
ing intolerant and racially hostile narratives’.90 In so
doing, the AC-FCNM has identified the danger of not
only hate speech but also the role that ‘stigmatization
and stereotyping’ plays in feeding hostility towards out-
groups.91 Furthermore, the AC-FCNM has recognised
that minorities may be scapegoated with the aim of ‘nur-
88. AC-FCNM Czech Republic, above n. 14, at paras. 53-54; AC-FCNM
Slovak Republic, above n. 16, at paras. 35-37.
89. AC-FCNM the Netherlands, above n. 21, at para. 54; AC-FCNM Italy,
above n. 28, at para. 58.
90. AC-FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at para. 73; AC-FCNM the
Netherlands, above n. 21, at para. 54.
91. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on the Republic of Moldova adopted on
25 May 2016 ACFC/OP/IV(2016)004, at para. 6.
92. AC-FCNM Cyprus, above n. 19, at para. 34.
turing and instrumentalising xenophobic sentiments in
the population’92 or for political gain.93
Significantly, the AC-FCNM has expressed concern
about the impact of these forms of categorisation on
broader societal conditions and, specifically, the poten-
tial for them to impact out-groups’ enjoyment of rights.
Thus, it has highlighted the impact of xenophobia and
intolerance on ‘society’s understanding of minority
identities and issues’,94 ‘a climate in which Muslims and
persons with a migration or minority background feel
unsafe’95 as well as ‘an attitude of impunity in which the
far right extremists feel emboldened to stage anti-Roma
demonstrations and physical attacks’.96 All of this has
been explicitly connected by the AC-FCNM to rights
violations, including hate crime,97 discrimination98 and
access to rights,99 including freedom of religion or
belief.100 Furthermore, the AC-FCNM has identified
how xenophobia and the construction of out-groups as a
threat combine in order to legitimise rights violations:
Anti-gypsyism and Islamophobia are reported to be
growing in particular on social media, and the nega-
tive public debate fed by stereotypes and the con-
struction of enemy images has also led to more fre-
quent violent attacks.101
Thus, through its practice, the AC-FCNM has identi-
fied explicit dehumanisation as a cause of rights viola-
tions. However, it tends not to engage with the impact
of unconscious or implicit categorisation on the realisa-
tion of rights. This is perhaps because it is much easier
to identify the resultant rights violations than it is to
identify implicit or unconscious categorisation as their
underlying cause.
Although the CERD, like the AC-FCNM, is a targeted
mechanism, its approach to dehumanisation aligns more
closely with that of the HRC. The Concluding Observa-
tions of the CERD and HRC since 2015 reveal that both
treaty bodies recognise express forms of categorisation,
such as hate speech and intolerant speech, as constitut-
ing rights violations, especially when such speech is
linked to hate crime. Thus, in relation to Switzerland,
the HRC expressed concern ‘about the increasing preva-
lence of hate speech and acts of hatred against the Mus-
lim, Jewish and Roma communities’.102 Similarly, in
relation to Poland, the CERD expressed concern at ‘the
prevalence of racist hate speech against minority groups
… which fuels hatred and intolerance’.103 While both
bodies tend to focus on speech that meets the threshold
93. AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 31; AC-FCNM Italy, above
n. 28, at para. 59.
94. AC-FCNM Denmark, above n. 31, at para. 65.
95. AC-FCNM Germany, above n. 20, at para. 56.
96. AC-FCNM Italy, above n. 28, at para. 59.
97. AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 36.
98. AC-FCNM Spain, above n. 45, at para. 40.
99. AC-FCNM Czech Republic, above n. 14, at para. 57.
100. AC-FCNM Spain, above n. 45, at para. 42.
101. AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 36.
102. HRC Switzerland, above n. 53, at para. 20.
103. CERD Poland, above n. 78, at para. 15.
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of hate speech, they have also suggested that less explicit
forms of categorisation such as stereotyping,104 preju-
dice,105 stigmatisation106 and ‘chronic negative portray-
al’107 constitute rights violations. The proliferation of
hate and intolerant speech by the media and politicians
has been singled out as particularly problematic by both
treaty bodies.108
Significantly, both mechanisms have explicitly recog-
nised that hate speech may result in human rights viola-
tions, insofar as it legitimises hate crime, violence and
‘acts of intimidation’ towards out-groups.109 Further,
the CERD has recognised that hate speech serves the
function of excluding out-groups from societal member-
ship, a practice that is recognised by social psychologists
as legitimising rights violations: ‘racist hate speech …
seeks to degrade the standing of individuals and groups
in the estimation of society’.110 Yet, with the exception
of hate crime and violence, these bodies tend not to
explicitly recognise the connection between categorisa-
tion, on the one hand, and rights violations, on the
other.
In some Concluding Observations, this link is made
implicitly, insofar as the negative portrayal of an out-
group is mentioned in the same paragraph as other
rights violations. For example, in relation to Sweden,
the CERD mentioned ‘stereotypical representation of
Muslims’, ‘reports of racist hate crimes and hate speech
against Muslim ethno-religious minority groups’,
‘reports of attacks against mosques’ and ‘difficulties …
in accessing employment and housing outside of minori-
ty-populated areas’.111 This suggests that the CERD is
aware that these are not unrelated issues, but it does not
expressly connect the rights violations with the underly-
ing cause. However, in other instances, these mechan-
isms have failed to make this connection even when
societal debates surrounding the adoption of laws that
violate rights, such as bans on building minarets112 or
wearing religious clothing,113 have explicitly categorised
out-groups.114 This is significant, as only when this link
104. CERD Czechia, above n. 70, at para. 11. See also CERD Hungary,
above n. 53, at para. 22; HRC Italy, above n. 82, at para. 74.
105. CERD Czechia, above n. 70, at para. 11. See also CERD Hungary,
above n. 53, at para. 22.
106. HRC Italy, above n. 82, at para. 74. See also CERD, Concluding obser-
vations on the combined nineteenth and twentieth periodic reports of
Italy, UN doc. CERD/C/ITA/CO/19-20 (2017), at para. 14.
107. HRC Sweden, above n. 83, at para. 16.
108. HRC Switzerland, above n. 53, at para. 20; HRC Sweden, above n. 83,
at para. 16; CERD Poland, above n. 78, at para. 15; CERD, Concluding
observations on the combined twenty-first to twenty-third periodic
reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
UN doc. CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23 (2016), at para. 15.
109. CERD United Kingdom, above n. 108, at para. 15; CERD Poland, above
n. 78, at para. 15; HRC Switzerland, above n. 53, at para. 20.
110. CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para.
10.
111. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-second and
twenty-third periodic reports of Sweden, UN doc. CERD/C/SWE/CO/
22-23 (2018), at para. 18.
112. HRC Switzerland, above n. 53, at para. 42.
113. HRC, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of France,
UN doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5 (2015), at para. 22.
114. See, for example, AC-FCNM, Second opinion on Switzerland adopted
on 29 February 2008 ACFC/OP/II(2008)002, at para. 89; European
is identified by the CERD and HRC, in the same para-
graph of Concluding Observations, do they require that
States adopt positive measures to address intolerance as
a cause of rights violations.115
Further, both Treaty Bodies have struggled to connect
rights violations to broader societal conditions, when the
categorisation of out-groups is not expressly articulated.
Thus, although the CERD has singled out the forced
sterilisation of Roma women in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia to be of particular concern,116 it has not explic-
itly linked this to the broader moral exclusion and
implicit categorisation of Roma in these societies. In
contrast, the HRC has connected patterns of societal
exclusion, in the form of ‘rejection, exclusion and vio-
lence’ faced by Roma in France, to broader rights viola-
tions in the form of discrimination in relation to ‘access
to health care, social benefits, education and housing
which is compounded by forced evictions from settle-
ments and a frequent lack of resettlement solutions’.117
However, this is the exception in the monitoring prac-
tice of the CERD and HRC. Notably, both bodies have
consistently expressed concern about discrimination
against migrants, foreigners, ethnic minorities and
Roma in the employment, education, housing and
healthcare sectors,118 the failure to provide sufficient
stopping sites for travellers and Roma,119 and forcible
evictions.120 Widespread or structural discrimination, as
disclosed by these patterns of exclusion, suggest that
categorisation is implicit or even unconscious. However,
the Treaty Bodies do not identify dehumanisation, if the
categorisation of the out-group is not explicitly articula-
ted. This directly impacts whether IHRL mechanisms
are able to ask States to address the societal conditions
that have facilitated these rights violations.
In contrast to the mixed approach of the CERD and
HRC, the ECtHR not only fails to identify the relevance
of dehumanisation to interferences with the rights of
migrants, Muslims and Roma, but has also allowed
States to explicitly dehumanise migrant and Muslim
applicants in order to legitimise interferences with their
rights. Under Article 8 ECHR, migrants are frequently
accepted by the ECtHR to be a threatening ‘other’,
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI Report on Switzer-
land (fourth monitoring cycle) adopted on 2 April 2009 CRI(2009)32,
at para. 120; A. Vakulenko, Islamic Veiling in Legal Discourse (2012) at
17-18; H. Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom
of Religion (2012), at 117-120.
115. CERD Sweden, above n. 111, at paras. 18-19; HRC Italy, above n. 82,
at paras. 12-13.
116. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined eleventh and twelfth
periodic reports of Slovakia, UN doc. CERD/C/SVK/CO/11-12 (2018),
at para. 23; CERD, Concluding observations on the combined tenth
and eleventh periodic reports of the Czech Republic, UN doc.
CERD/C/CZE/CO/10-11 (2015), at para. 22; CERD Czechia, above n.
70, at para. 19.
117. HRC France, above n. 113, at para. 13.
118. HRC, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Spain,
UN doc. CCPR/C/ESP/CO/6 (2015), at para. 9; HRC, Concluding
observations on the seventh periodic report of Norway, UN doc.
CCPR/C/NOR/CO/7 (2018), at para. 8.
119. HRC Switzerland, above n. 53, at para. 50.
120. HRC Italy, above n. 82, at para. 14.
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whose rights must give way to immigration control121 or
the economic well-being of the State.122 This has led
scholars to criticise the ECtHR for endorsing the por-
trayal of migrants as less human than citizens and, there-
fore, for accepting that migrants do not have the same
entitlement to rights as members of the in-group.123
Similarly, the ECtHR has been accused of relying on
stereotypes of Islam and of unfavourably comparing
Islam and, by extension, Muslims with ‘European val-
ues’ and ‘Europeans’, in order to legitimise not finding a
violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 9
ECHR.124 For example, the ECtHR has accepted that
the visible presence of Islam poses a threat to the in-
group, insofar as it has a ‘proselytising’ effect,125 chal-
lenges the secular foundations of the State126 and under-
mines societal cohesion.127 Thus, by accepting the in-
group’s portrayal of Muslim applicants as less human
and, therefore, as less deserving of rights, the ECtHR
has not only failed to recognise the connection between
categorisation and the realisation of rights but has also
participated in this process. Nonetheless, in S.A.S. v.
France, concerning the so-called French ‘burqa ban’, the
ECtHR did express concern at the institutionalisation of
dehumanisation, insofar as
a State which enters into a legislative process of this
kind takes the risk of contributing to the consolida-
tion of the stereotypes which affect certain categories
of the population and of encouraging the expression
of intolerance, when it has a duty, on the contrary, to
promote tolerance.128
However, by deferring to the State through the margin
of appreciation in this case, the ECtHR signalled its
121. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, ECHR
(1985) Series A No. 94, at para. 67; Boujlifa v. France, ECHR (1997)
Reports 1997-VI, at para. 42; Nunez v. Norway, ECHR (2011) Applica-
tion No. 55597/09, at para. 71.
122. Berrehab v. the Netherlands, ECHR (1988) Series A No. 138, at para.
26.
123. C. Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European
Law (2016), at 128; A. Desmond, ‘The Private Life of Family Matters:
Curtailing Human Rights Protection for Migrants under Article 8 of the
ECHR?’, 29 European Journal of International Law 261, at 265 (2018).
M.-B. Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint
(2015), at 504.
124. See further, K. Henrard, ‘State Obligations to Counter Islamophobia:
Comparing Fault Lines in the Supervisory Practice of the HRC/ICCPR,
the ECtHR and the AC/FCNM’, in this special edition. See, also, C.
Evans, ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’, 7
Melbourne Journal of International Law 52, at 65-67 (2006); C.H.
Skeet, ‘Orientalism in the European Court of Human Rights’, 14
Religion and Human Rights 31 (2019); K. Henrard, ‘Integration Reason-
ing at the ECtHR: Challenging the Boundaries of Minorities’ Citizen-
ship’, 38 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 55, at 70-72 (2020).
125. Dahlab v. Switzerland, ECHR (2001) Reports 2001-V.
126. Ibid.; Leyla Șahın v. Turkey, ECHR (2005) Reports 2005-XI, at para.
115; Dogru v. France, ECHR (2008) Application No. 27058/05, at para.
72.
127. S.A.S., above n. 87, at para. 141; Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzer-
land, ECHR (2017) Application No. 29086/12, at paras. 96-97. For a
more detailed discussion of this point, see generally, Henrard (2020),
above n. 124.
128. S.A.S., above n. 87, at para. 149.
unwillingness to challenge the majority’s perception of
threat and effectively endorsed the dehumanisation of
the Muslim applicant.
In contrast to its treatment of migrants and Muslims,
the ECtHR has explicitly recognised that travellers and
Roma may be subject to rights violations as a direct
result of intolerance and prejudice linked to their identi-
ty.129 Nonetheless, the ECtHR has historically been
slow to recognise that violations of the rights of Roma or
traveller applicants are enabled by widespread dehu-
manisation, in the absence of explicit articulations of
discriminatory motives.130 While, more recently, the
ECtHR has begun to identify violations of Article 14
ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination, in cases con-
cerning Roma,131 its approach has been inconsistent.132
Thus, in V.C. v Slovakia, concerning the forced sterili-
sation of a Roma woman, the ECtHR found a violation
of Articles 3 and 8, but not Article 14 ECHR as it was
unconvinced ‘that it was part of an organised policy or
that the hospital staff’s conduct was intentionally racial-
ly motivated’.133 Despite a wealth of evidence from the
AC-FCNM, CERD and HRC134 and a dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Mijovic, which emphasised that this was a
specific issue faced by Roma women in Slovakia that
had been legitimised by the broader societal context,135
the ECtHR failed to recognise the role played by dehu-
manisation in this rights violation. By individualising
human rights violations committed against Roma, the
ECtHR fails to recognise that the implicit categorisation
of this out-group by the broader society underpins indi-
vidual rights violations.
Thus, while the AC-FCNM, CERD and HRC have
recognised that the explicit categorisation of out-groups
results in rights violation, the ECtHR has not only failed
to recognise the significance of dehumanisation but has
also contributed to this process itself. To some extent,
this pattern can again be attributed to the mandates and
working methods of these mechanisms. The AC-
FCNM, CERD and HRC all monitor State reports, a
process that allows them to obtain a broad understand-
ing of the situation prevailing in a State and how this
pertains to the realisation of the rights of out-groups.
129. Chapman v. United Kingdom, ECHR (2001) Reports 2001-I, at para.
96.
130. See further, R. Sandland, ‘Developing a Jurisprudence of Difference:
The Protection of the Human Rights of Travelling Peoples by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights’, 8 Human Rights Law Review 475, at 485
(2008). See for example, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1996)
Reports 1996-IV; Velikova v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2000) Reports 2000-VI;
Anguelova v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2002) Reports 2002-IV.
131. See, for example, Nachova, above n. 71; Moldovan and Others v.
Romania (No. 2), ECHR (2005) Reports 2005-VII; Stoica v. Romania,
ECHR (2008) Application No. 42722/02; D.H. and others v. the Czech
Republic, ECHR (2007) Reports 2007-IV.
132. Balogh v. Hungary, ECHR (2004) Application No. 47940/99; Bekos and
Koutropoulos v. Greece, ECHR (2005) Reports 2005-XIII; Cobzaru v.
Romania, ECHR (2007) Application No. 8254/99.
133. V.C. v. Slovakia, ECHR (2011) Application No, 18968/07, at para. 177.
134. S.E. Berry, ‘The Siren’s Call? Exploring the Implications of an Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights on National
Minorities’, 23 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1,
at 30-31 (2016).
135. V.C. (2011), above n. 133, at dissenting opinion Judge Mijovic.
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This facilitates the identification of dehumanisation at a
societal and institutional level. In contrast, as the
ECtHR does not monitor State reports, its competence
is restricted to the facts of the case before it. As the facts
of the case are, inevitably, individualised, this restricts
the ECtHR’s ability to identify whether the interference
with the applicant’s rights was a result of the dehumani-
sation of the out-group.
However, in D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, the
ECtHR demonstrated that it is able to find a violation of
Article 14 ECHR, when the facts of the case before it
form part of a broader pattern of discrimination or intol-
erance against an out-group.136 Thus, moving forward,
there are opportunities for the ECtHR to strengthen its
work in this area. The ECtHR could, for example, solic-
it information from third party interveners in order to
inform its decisions in cases where broader societal
intolerance appears to have undermined access to rights,
rather than individualising violations that are clearly
structural. The ECtHR could also, through obiter dicta,
engage with the impact of dehumanisation on the reali-
sation of rights and more clearly establish the scope of
States’ positive obligation to counter such dehumanisa-
tion. Further, States are frequently afforded a margin of
appreciation in cases concerning the rights of persons
belonging to minorities.137 The ECtHR could make rec-
ognition of this margin of appreciation contingent on
the State’s compliance with its positive obligation to fos-
ter tolerant societies, in cases where patterns of discri-
mination or intolerance appear to underpin the interfer-
ence with the applicant’s rights or where the actions of
the State have increased intolerance towards out-
groups, as the ECtHR explicitly recognised in SAS v.
France.138
Despite the existence of positive States obligations to
prevent hate speech and to foster tolerant societies
under all instruments, the IHRL mechanisms explored
in this section have yet to fully appreciate the impact of
dehumanisation on the realisation of rights. In particu-
lar, while they are aware of the connection between hate
speech and hate crime, they are much less aware of the
impact of categorisation on a wider range of rights,
especially when categorisation is implicit or uncon-
scious. This directly impacts whether the recommenda-
tions of these mechanisms require that States address
dehumanisation as a cause of rights violations. Con-
sequently, if IHRL is to achieve its purpose and protect
out-groups from rights violations, then IHRL monitor-
ing bodies must explicitly recognise the root causes of
these violations.
136. D.H. and others (2007), above n. 131, at paras. 191-95.
137. Berry (2016), above n. 134.
138. S.A.S., above n. 87, at para. 149.
5 The Content and Scope of a
Positive State Obligation to
Counter Dehumanisation
Under IHRL, States are required to both adopt meas-
ures to restrict forms of speech that facilitate dehumani-
sation and address the societal intolerance that under-
pins dehumanisation. However, in practice, IHRL mon-
itoring mechanisms have yet to fully appreciate the
impact that dehumanisation has on the realisation of
rights. Drawing on social psychology and related fields,
this section analyses whether monitoring mechanisms’
interpretation of the scope of States’ obligations to pre-
vent hate and/or intolerant speech and to create tolerant
societies is sufficient to counter dehumanisation as a
cause of rights violations. Further, it identifies how the
current practice of these mechanisms can be strength-
ened in order to encourage States to adopt a more
robust response to dehumanisation. Significantly,
despite the existence of these obligations under the
ECHR, in practice, the ECtHR has rarely found a viola-
tion in cases where the State has failed to ensure toler-
ance of out-groups139 and has not elaborated the content
of these obligations. Consequently, this section focuses
exclusively on the practice of the AC-FCNM, CERD
and HRC. It is revealed that while a comprehensive
interpretation of States’ obligation to prevent hate
and/or intolerant speech has been developed by these
mechanisms, they must elaborate the substance of the
obligation to create a tolerant society in more detail, if
States are to effectively counter dehumanisation.
5.1 Preventing Hate and/or Intolerant Speech
Intolerant speech, including hate speech, explicitly cate-
gorises out-groups. Further, it has the potential to rein-
force and strengthen the dehumanisation of out-groups,
particularly when such expressions are legitimised by
those with authority, either expressly, through repeti-
tion, or implicitly, by failing to condemn.140 Con-
sequently, reducing the space for intolerant speech in
the public sphere has the potential to reduce the dehu-
manisation of out-groups. The AC-FCNM, CERD and
HRC have identified two main components of the posi-
tive obligation to prevent intolerant and/or hate speech:
first, an obligation to adopt effective laws to prohibit
hate speech, and, second, an obligation to regulate the
speech of individuals who have the ability to influence
public opinion, such as politicians and the media. In
developing the content of these obligations, the three
mechanisms have provided States with specific guidance
and have sought to balance the need to restrict hate
speech with the needs of democratic society.
139. See, for example, S.A.S., above n. 87, at dissenting opinion of Judges
Nussberger and Jäderblom, at para. 14. Cf. Supreme Holy Council of
the Muslim Community, above n. 86, at para. 96.
140. W.A. Donohue, ‘The Identity Trap: The Language of Genocide’, 31
Journal of Language and Social Psychology 13 (2011).
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At the most fundamental level, the AC-FCNM and
CERD have stressed that States must ensure that
domestic legislation prohibiting hate speech is compre-
hensive141 and is implemented in practice,142 through
proper investigation, prosecution and sanctions.143
Beyond this basic standard, the AC-FCNM and CERD
have emphasised that law enforcement, prosecutors and
the judiciary should receive appropriate and regular
training to ensure the effectiveness of these laws.144 In
order to improve reporting, States should seek to raise
out-groups’ awareness of the existence of hate speech
legislation145 and improve trust between out-groups and
law enforcement authorities,146 including by increasing
diversity in the police force.147 Thus, in addition to
adopting laws to prohibit hate speech, monitoring
mechanisms have also required that States ensure these
laws are effective in practice.
The AC-FCNM, CERD and HRC have also required
that States adopt measures to reduce the impact of hate
or intolerant speech by those who have the potential to
influence public opinion. As noted by Donohue,
‘[c]learly, public language matters; it creates a context
for how people interact with one another’.148 Here, the
media and politicians have the potential to lead public
opinion in a way that individual acts of intolerance do
not. Within social psychology and genocide studies,
both the media and the politicians have been recognised
as playing a key role in the dehumanisation of out-
groups149 and have been implicated in the commission
of mass atrocities.150 Thus, it is clear that if IHRL is to
achieve its purpose, politicians and the media cannot be
141. CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para. 9;
AC-FCNM Finland, above n. 63, at para. 105; AC-FCNM Germany,
above n. 20, at paras. 61 and 70.
142. CERD Ireland, above n. 77, at para. 22(a); CERD Norway, above n. 53,
at para. 14(b).
143. CERD United Kingdom, above n. 108, at para. 16(a); CERD Poland,
above n. 78, at paras. 22(e) and 24(e); AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75,
at para. 39; AC-FCNM Finland, above n. 63, at para. 57. See also, HRC
United Kingdom, above n. 13, at para. 10(d); HRC Hungary, above n.
56, at para. 18.
144. CERD, Concluding observations on the twentieth to twenty-second
periodic reports of Greece, UN doc. CERD/C/GRC/CO/20-22 (2016),
at para. 17(b); CERD Sweden, above n. 111, at para. 11(c); AC-FCNM
Finland, above n. 63, at para. 104; AC-FCNM Cyprus, above n. 19, at
para. 39.
145. AC-FCNM the Netherlands, above n. 21, at para. 66; AC-FCNM,
Fourth Opinion on Norway adopted on 13 October 2016 ACFC/OP/
IV(2016)008, at para. 58; CERD Greece, above n. 144, at paras. 17(d)
and (e); CERD United Kingdom, above n. 108, at para. 16(c). See also,
HRC, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Austria,
UN doc. CCPR/C/AUT/CO/5 (2015), at para. 16.
146. AC-FCNM Finland, above n. 63, at para. 57; AC-FCNM Germany,
above n. 20, at para. 77; CERD United Kingdom, above n. 108, at para.
16(c); CERD Greece, above n. 144, at paras. 17(e).
147. AC-FCNM Finland, above n. 63, at para. 57; AC-FCNM Germany,
above n. 20, at para. 77.
148. Donohue, above n. 140, at 28.
149. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams & Jackson, above n. 38, at 304; Donohue,
above n. 140, at 14; 25; Stanton, above n. 41, at 214-15; Opotow,
above n. 24, at 13; A. De Buyse, ‘Words of Violence: “Fear Speech,” or
How Violent Conflict Escalation Relates to the Freedom of Expression’,
36 Human Rights Quarterly 779, at 779- 81 (2014).
150. Donohue, above n. 140, at 13, 14, 25; Stanton, above n. 41, at
214-15.
permitted to spread hate or intolerance without inter-
vention. However, IHRL – particularly in Europe – is
premised on the understanding that democracy and
human rights are mutually reinforcing.151 Given the
central role that politicians and the media play in ensur-
ing effective democracy, the regulation of hate and
intolerant speech is a complex area for IHRL mechan-
isms to navigate. Significantly, CERD has sought to
adopt a nuanced approach and has explicitly acknowl-
edged that whether speech constitutes hate speech is
context specific and that factors including ‘the
economic, social and political climate’, ‘the position or
status of the speaker’, and ‘the reach of the speech’ must
be taken into account.152
The AC-FCNM and CERD have both emphasised the
need for the authorities to publicly condemn acts of hate
speech and related phenomena such as racist propagan-
da and ‘derogatory and intolerant language’,153
particularly when perpetrated by politicians or others in
the public eye.154 Such condemnation serves to prevent
intolerant speech from being normalised in society
through the silence or acquiescence of those in authori-
ty. Further, if the authorities challenge the categorisa-
tion of the out-group, this also has the potential to break
the recursive cycle whereby society and the public
authorities legitimise the adoption of increasingly
extreme measures in response to a perceived threat
posed by out-groups. Significantly, both the AC-
FCNM and CERD have recognised that such condem-
nation is a necessary component of ‘promoting a culture
of tolerance and respect’,155 thus reaffirming the mutu-
ally reinforcing nature of measures to restrict the impact
of hate speech and measures to foster tolerance.
Beyond condemnation, both the AC-FCNM and
CERD have recommended that States adopt measures
to restrict hate and intolerant speech in political dis-
course and the media. In relation to hate speech in
political discourse, the AC-FCNM has asked States to
call ‘on all political parties to refrain from using it’,156
and take steps ‘to combat stereotypes and prejudice in
political discourse’.157 Similarly, the CERD has asked
that the authorities ‘call upon politicians to ensure that
their public statements do not contribute to intolerance,
stigmatization or incitement to hatred’.158 Further, the
151. S.E. Berry, ‘Democracy and the Preservation of Minority Identity: Frag-
mentation within the European Human Rights Framework’, 24 Inter-
national Journal on Minority and Group Rights 205, at 212-13 (2017).
152. CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para.
15.
153. AC-FCNM Norway (2016), above n. 145, at para. 53.
154. CERD United Kingdom, above n. 108, at para. 16(d); CERD, Conclud-
ing observations on the combined nineteenth to twenty-second period-
ic reports of Germany, UN doc. CERD/C/DEU/CO/19-22 (2015), at
para. 9; AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 40; AC-FCNM Fin-
land, above n. 63, at para. 53.
155. CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para.
37. See also CERD United Kingdom, above n. 108, at para. 16(d); AC-
FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at para. 76; AC-FCNM Spain,
above n. 45, at para. 48.
156. AC-FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at para. 76.
157. AC-FCNM Czech Republic, above n. 14, para. 57.
158. CERD Finland, above n. 78, at para. 11(c).
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CERD has explicitly emphasised the need to apply leg-
islation on hate speech to politicians and public offi-
cials.159 Significantly, neither mechanism has required
that States legislate to prohibit forms of intolerant
political speech that do not meet the threshold of hate
speech but, nonetheless, have the potential to categorise
out-groups.
This is perhaps where these mechanisms have sought to
strike a balance between protecting out-groups from
speech that categorises, on the one hand, and allowing
space for democratic debate, on the other. The prohi-
bition of forms of speech that the in-group perceives to
be legitimate would not only remove the opportunity for
such ideas to be contested but would also run the risk of
reducing confidence in the democratic process. Once
dehumanisation has been institutionalised and/or nor-
malised in political discourse, as it has in many Europe-
an States, then the in-group is unlikely to respond posi-
tively to the condemnation of speech that it perceives to
be legitimate.160 This is because, as noted by Haslam
and Loughnan, ‘people actively resist information that
challenges them’ and the self-identification of the in-
group is based on negative comparisons with the out-
group.161 Consequently, the condemnation of intolerant
speech in public discourse is more likely to be effective
if it is adopted to prevent rather than counter dehuman-
isation.
Both the AC-FCNM and CERD have expressed con-
cern that the portrayal of minorities by the media has
the potential to perpetuate intolerance.162 Media expres-
sions that negatively categorise out-groups but do not
constitute hate speech pose particularly complex issues
for monitoring mechanisms. Thus, the AC-FCNM and
CERD have emphasised the need for media profession-
als to undertake training to improve reporting on minor-
ity groups and diversity.163 While both bodies have rec-
ognised the need for some form of press regulation,164
the AC-FCNM has emphasised that measures should
not impact the freedom or independence of the press.165
In contrast, the CERD has recommended formal regula-
tory measures, through legislation,166 professional codes
of conduct or professional ethics167 and media supervi-
sory mechanisms.168 However, some forms of reporting
159. CERD Italy, above n. 106, at paras. 15(a) and (g); CERD Norway, above
n. 53, at paras. 14(a) and (c). See also, AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75,
at para. 38.
160. Haslam and Loughnan, above n. 7, at 416.
161. Ibid.
162. CERD Czechia, above n. 70, at para. 11(c); CERD Hungary, above n.
53, at para. 16; AC-FCNM Denmark, above n. 31, at para. 64; AC-
FCNM Italy, above n. 28, at para. 58.
163. AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 40; AC-FCNM Germany,
above n. 20, at para. 65; AC-FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at
para. 76; CERD Czechia, above n. 70, at para. 12(c).
164. AC-FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at para. 97; CERD General
recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para. 39.
165. AC-FCNM Germany, above n. 20, at para. 65; AC-FCNM, Fifth Opin-
ion on Denmark adopted on 7 November 2019 ACFC/OP/V(2019)003,
at para. 76.
166. CERD Slovakia, above n. 116, at para. 14(a).
167. CERD Italy, above n. 106, at para. 15(f).
168. CERD Greece, above n. 144, at para. 17(c).
that reinforce negative stereotypes tend to avoid regula-
tion, for example when newspapers report only the eth-
nicity of minority criminals. In this respect, rather than
formal regulation, the CERD has suggested that the
‘[m]edia should avoid referring unnecessarily to race,
ethnicity, religion and other group characteristics in a
manner that may promote intolerance’.169 Further, the
AC-FCNM has called on the authorities in the UK
to engage with media outlets to promote a more
nuanced understanding and reporting of facts to
avoid fuelling intolerant and ethnically hostile behav-
iour while promoting the use of less derogatory lan-
guage.170
While this is a complex area for IHRL monitoring
mechanisms to navigate, the AC-FCNM and CERD
have clearly sought to balance the need to counter dehu-
manisation with the requirements of a democratic
society. These mechanisms have sought to develop pre-
cise and nuanced guidance for States that requires the
prohibition of hate speech but also recognises the dan-
gers of the over-regulation of intolerant speech, espe-
cially if the negative categorisation of out-groups is
already ingrained within society.
5.2 Creating Tolerant Societies
While regulation and condemnation have the potential
to reduce the influence of speech that categorises, they
do not address the societal root causes of dehumanisa-
tion nor do they address implicit or unconscious catego-
risation. In order to address these issues, States must
seek to change societal attitudes and create societies that
are tolerant of diversity. Significantly, the AC-FCNM,
CERD and HRC have recommended that States adopt
measures to address the societal root causes of hate
speech as well as other forms of intolerant speech
through, for example, ‘awareness-raising campaigns’.171
IHRL also establishes a positive State obligation to cre-
ate tolerant societies. This section draws on social psy-
chology, and the related fields of interculturalism and
genocide studies, in order to analyse whether IHRL
mechanisms’ interpretation of States’ positive obligation
in this respect is sufficient to improve societal tolerance
and, thereby, reduce the dehumanisation that legitimi-
ses rights violations.
During State reporting processes, the AC-FCNM,
CERD and HRC have frequently recommended that
States ‘promote tolerance and understanding’ or devel-
op integration policies and strategies,172 without elabo-
rating what this entails in practice. More specific recom-
169. CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above n. 62, at para.
40.
170. AC-FCNM United Kingdom, above n. 42, at para. 76.
171. AC-FCNM Norway (2016), above n. 145, at para. 53; AC-FCNM Swit-
zerland, above n. 70, at para. 64; CERD Czechia, above n. 70, at para.
12(b); HRC the Netherlands, above n. 63, at para. 16; HRC Hungary,
above n. 56, at para. 18.
172. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Malta adopted on 14 October 2016
ACFC/OP/IV(2016)009, at para. 25; AC-FCNM the Netherlands, above
n. 21, at para. 57.
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mendations focus on the adoption of awareness-raising
activities and educational campaigns to promote toler-
ance173 or eliminate prejudice and counteract stereo-
types.174 However, these recommendations tend not to
elaborate the form such activities should take. The most
detailed guidance provided by the AC-FCNM and
CERD concerns the design of inclusive education cur-
ricula to increase knowledge of the history and culture
of out-groups.175 For example, the CERD has required
that Italy ‘ensure that the school curriculum includes
the history of the State party’s colonial past in order to
convey the consequences and the continued impact of
racially discriminatory policies’.176
From the perspective of social psychology, while inclu-
sive school curricula and public awareness campaigns
have the potential to improve societal cohesion,177 they
are insufficient to create tolerant societies.178 This is
because knowledge alone is unlikely to counter dehu-
manisation, especially if groups tend not to interact with
one another or when such interactions are primarily
negative.179 If the out-group has already been dehuman-
ised, the in-group is likely to view stereotypes as legiti-
mate, not see the need to address intolerance against
out-groups, and/or have a vested interest in the nega-
tive categorisation of the out-group.180 In this case, the
in-group is unlikely to engage with educational activities
that actively challenge their beliefs. Consequently,
measures that seek to counter pre-existing dehumanisa-
tion are less likely to be successful than measures that
seek to prevent dehumanisation in the first place. In
order to counter pre-existing dehumanisation, IHRL
mechanisms must adopt more robust recommendations
that require that States combine educational measures
with more wide-ranging measures designed to create
tolerant societies.
Building on Allport’s Contact Theory,181 social psychol-
ogists and interculturalists have suggested that increased
interactions between different societal groups, with the
173. AC-FCNM Czech Republic, above n. 14, at para. 57; AC-FCNM Finland
(2016), above n. 63, at para. 52; CERD Poland (2018), above n. 78, at
para. 16(c); CERD Norway, above n. 53, at para. 12(e); HRC Hungary,
above n. 56, at para. 18; HRC Italy, above n. 82, at para. 13; HRC Swe-
den, above n. 83, at para. 17.
174. CERD Czechia, above n. 70, at para. 12(b); CERD Norway, above n. 53,
at para. 12(e); HRC Hungary, above n. 56, at para. 18.
175. Art. 12 FCNM; CERD General recommendation No. 35 (2013), above
n. 62, at paras. 34-35.
176. CERD Italy, above n. 106, at para. 26(e). See also, CERD United
Kingdom, above n. 108, at para. 35(c).
177. L. Bekemans, ‘Educational Challenges and Perspectives in Multi-
culturalism vs. Interculturalism: Citizenship. Education for Intercultural
Realities’, in M. Barrett (ed.), Interculturalism and Multiculturalism:
Similarities and Differences (2013), at 177, 183; G. Bouchard, ‘Intercul-
turalism: What Makes it Distinctive?’, in M. Barrett (ed.), Intercultural-
ism and Multiculturalism: Similarities and Differences (2013), at 107.
178. W.G. Stephan and C.W. Stephan, ‘An Integrated Threat Theory of Prej-
udice’, in S. Oskamp (ed.), Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination
(2000), at 40-41.
179. A. Rodríguez Pérez, N. Delgado Rodríguez, V. Betancor Rodríguez, J.P.
Leyens & J. Vaes, ‘Infra-humanization of Outgroups throughout the
World. The Role of Similarity, Intergroup Friendship, Knowledge of the
Outgroup, and Status’, 27 Anales de Psicología 679, at 685-86 (2011).
180. Haslam and Loughnan, above n. 7, at 416.
181. See generally, G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954).
aim of developing affective ties and intergroup friend-
ship, are necessary to reduce the prejudice that under-
pins dehumanisation.182 Similarly, within genocide
studies, Donohue highlights the potential for everyday
interactions in the workplace to reduce dehumanisation:
‘[u]nderlying these efforts could also be attempts to ini-
tiate dialogue groups that allow individuals from differ-
ent sides to simply become more comfortable with one
another’.183 The cohesion strand of interculturalism
likewise requires the creation of spaces and opportuni-
ties for intercultural interactions to take place184 and the
removal of barriers to successful interactions,185 with the
aim of breaking down ‘prejudices, stereotypes and mis-
conceptions of others’ and generating ‘mutual under-
standing, reciprocal identification, societal trust and sol-
idarity’.186
Notably, monitoring mechanisms have been able to
interpret States’ positive obligation to create tolerant
societies to encompass an obligation to foster affective
ties and intergroup friendships. While ‘awareness-rais-
ing activities’ have been the default recommendation of
monitoring mechanisms, both the AC-FCNM and
CERD have occasionally highlighted the need for States
to facilitate interactions between different groups in
society through ‘trust-building activities’ and the crea-
tion of platforms to facilitate dialogue between different
groups.187 Further, in the educational setting, the AC-
FCNM has emphasised the importance of ‘bringing
together pupils’188 from different backgrounds and
organising ‘classes and school activities in ways that
facilitate intercultural exchanges and the development
of friendships’.189 It has also highlighted examples of
best practice during the State reporting process, such as
the ‘BookEdu’ programme in Copenhagen, which pro-
motes intercultural dialogue in schools.190 These activi-
ties have the potential to facilitate meaningful contact
between the in-group and out-groups. However, these
recommendations are rare, and when they are made, the
terminology used, such as ‘trust building exercises’, is
182. Rodríguez Pérez, Delgado Rodríguez, Betancor Rodríguez, Leyens &
Vaes, above n. 179, at 681; P. Loobuyck, ‘Towards an Intercultural
Sense of Belonging Together: Reflections on the Theoretical and
Political Level’, in N. Meer, T. Modood & R. Zapata-Barrero (eds.),
Interculturalism and Multiculturalism (2016), at 225; T. Cantle, ‘Inter-
culturalism as a New Narrative for the Era of Globalisation and Super-
Diversity’, in M. Barrett (ed.), Interculturalism and Multiculturalism:
Similarities and Differences (2013), at 69, 83. See also, Tourkochoriti,
above n. 3, for a discussion of how instrumental intergroup interven-
tions can reduce prejudice.
183. Donohue, above n. 140, at 27.
184. Cantle, above n. 182, at 79.
185. M. Barrett, ‘Intercultural Competence: A Distinctive Hallmark of Inter-
culturalism?’, in M. Barrett (ed.), Interculturalism and Multiculturalism:
Similarities and Differences (2013), at 157.
186. Loobuyck, above n. 182, at 230.
187. AC-FCNM Norway, above n. 140, at para. 53; AC-FCNM Cyprus,
above n. 19, at para. 36; CERD Norway, above n. 53, at para. 24;
CERD, General recommendation No. 27 on discrimination against
Roma, UN doc. A/55/18, annex V (2000), at para. 9.
188. AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Estonia adopted on 19 March 2015
ACFC/OP/IV(2015)002, at para. 84.
189. AC-FCNM Cyprus, above n. 19, at para. 59.
190. AC-FCNM Denmark (2019), above n. 166, at para. 91. See also, AC-
FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 31.
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vague. Guidance for States is specifically needed
because the in-group is likely to resist measures that aim
to facilitate intergroup contact if they perceive that the
out-group poses a threat to its well-being.191 If partici-
pation in intercultural activities is not voluntary and
does not respect the rights of all members of society,
including freedom of association, it risks breeding
resentment and becoming counterproductive.
Further, if measures to facilitate intercultural contact
are to be successful, IHRL mechanisms must require
that States address structural discrimination. Intercul-
turalists have emphasised that structural discrimination
poses barriers to successful interactions, by reducing the
opportunities for everyday interactions between the in-
group and out-groups.192 Desegregation in the educa-
tional context has the potential to facilitate interactions
between pupils of different backgrounds and presents
the opportunity for sources of intergroup tension to be
directly addressed.193 Significantly, both the AC-
FCNM and CERD have consistently highlighted the
need for States to adopt a range of measures to tackle
societal segregation, specifically in relation to Roma in
the context of education, employment and housing,
under rights relating to non-discrimination, equality
and education.194 Significantly, neither body has recog-
nised the central role played by measures to counter
segregation and structural discrimination in fostering
societal tolerance. Nonetheless, the elaboration of
States’ obligations in this respect has the potential to
facilitate the creation of tolerant societies.
However, there is a danger that measures intended to
remove structural disadvantage by creating mixed
neighbourhoods, for example, run the risk of serving an
assimilatory function and violating the rights of out-
groups.195 Notably, this appears to have been anticipa-
ted by the AC-FCNM and CERD, insofar as they have
emphasised that States must consult with out-groups in
the development of policies or strategies that pertain to
their own social inclusion.196
Finally, Haslem and Loughnan suggest that a ‘way to
reduce dehumanization is to promote a common or
superordinate identity, thereby emphasizing the similar-
ities and shared fate of different subgroups and de-
191. Stephan and Stephan, above n. 178, at 38; Haslam and Loughnan,
above n. 7, at 416.
192. Barrett, above n. 185, at 157.
193. See further, A. Kok, ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: Proposals for Legislative Reform to
Promote Equality Through Schools and the Education System’, in this
special edition.
194. CERD Germany, above n. 154, at para. 13(c); CERD Czechia, above n.
70, at para. 18; CERD, Concluding observations on the combined
twelfth and thirteenth periodic reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN
doc. CERD/C/BIH/CO/12-13 (2018), at para. 23(b); CERD Slovakia,
above n. 116, at para. 12(b); CERD Serbia, above n. 63, at para. 23;
CERD Finland, above n. 78, at para. 13.
195. S.E. Berry, ‘Aligning Interculturalism with International Human Rights
Law: “Living Together” without Assimilation’, 18 Human Rights Law
Review 441, at 459 (2018).
196. AC-FCNM Austria, above n. 75, at para. 34; AC-FCNM Spain, above n.
45, at para. 50; CERD Poland, above n. 78, at para. 22; CERD General
recommendation No. 27 (2000), above n. 187, at para. 9.
emphasizing their boundaries’.197 As the creation of a
common identity aims to reduce prejudice, it is possible
for this to fall within States’ positive obligation to create
tolerant societies. However, national identity is often a
politically sensitive subject, especially if the in-group
believes that the out-group poses a threat to its cultural
existence.198 Thus, official attempts to create an inclu-
sive identity may be viewed as a threat to national iden-
tity, heighten the sense of threat that underpins dehu-
manisation and may even be counterproductive.199 It is,
then, perhaps unsurprising that IHRL mechanisms have
rarely recommended that States seek to create an inclu-
sive identity, with the exception of the AC-FCNM in
relation to Moldova. Here, the AC-FCNM recommen-
ded that the authorities
implement a long-term strategy for the formation of a
civic identity that is inclusive and firmly based on
respect for ethnic and linguistic diversity as an inte-
gral part of Moldovan society [emphasis added].200
It is, however, possible for IHRL mechanisms to recom-
mend less divisive measures that, nonetheless, have the
potential to facilitate the creation of an inclusive super-
ordinate identity. Here, interculturalist Zapata-Barrero
suggests ‘redesigning institutions and policies in all
fields to treat diversity as a potential resource and a
public good, and not as a nuisance to be contained’.201
Notably, both the AC-FCNM and CERD have recog-
nised the potential for the public authorities to develop a
‘positive political culture’202 and send a positive message
about diversity.203 Further, the AC-FCNM has recom-
mended that States seek to create a sense of societal
belonging for all groups204 and adopt strategies to
ensure the integration of society as a whole, rather than
focusing only on the integration of out-groups.205 It has
also stressed the importance of an inclusive public dis-
course for both negotiating space for diversity within
society and ensuring that such negotiations do not
become a source of conflict.206 Thus, a number of the
measures suggested by the AC-FCNM have the poten-
tial to create an inclusive superordinate national or civic
identity, but its measured approach has the potential to
offset the divisiveness of the subject.
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198. G. Bouchard, ‘What is Interculturalism?’, 56 McGill Law Journal 435, at
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ACFC/OP/III(2013)004, at 2; AC-FCNM, Fourth Opinion on Bosnia
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IV(2017)007, at para. 73.
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The AC-FCNM and CERD have recognised that a
range of measures are required to create tolerant societ-
ies. While their recommendations broadly correspond
with those identified within social psychology and inter-
culturalism, these recommendations must be strength-
ened if dehumanisation is to be successfully countered.
Specifically, monitoring mechanisms must explicitly
recognise that educational measures alone are insuffi-
cient to foster a tolerant society. Recommendations
should regularly emphasise that education must be bol-
stered with measures to facilitate intercultural dialogue
alongside measures to create an inclusive superordinate
identity. Barriers to tolerance, such as structural discri-
mination, must be removed as part of these efforts.
Significantly, the AC-FCNM has elaborated the con-
tent of States’ positive obligation to foster a tolerant
society in the most detail. This can be attributed to the
existence of an explicit obligation in Article 6(1) FCNM
but also to the fact that its Opinions on State Reports
are far more detailed than Treaty Bodies’ Concluding
Observations. However, if dehumanisation as a root
cause of rights violations is to be successfully addressed
and IHRL is to achieve its purpose, then all IHRL mon-
itoring mechanisms must urgently develop their prac-
tice in this area. The potential for the ECtHR to elabo-
rate the content of a positive obligation to foster tolerant
societies has been considered above. However, the other
three IHRL monitoring mechanisms considered here
serve a more preventative function than the ECtHR,
and as a result have greater opportunities to elaborate
the content of this obligation through State reporting
processes and General Comments/Recommendations or
Thematic Commentaries. While it is not the role of
IHRL monitoring mechanisms to prescribe how States
meet their obligations, these three mechanisms can pro-
vide detailed, non-prescriptive, guidance for States that
draw on best practices and elaborate the purpose of dif-
ferent types of activities and the prerequisites for their
success. This guidance is all the more important as
agents of the State frequently perpetrate or are complic-
it in rights violations that are underpinned by the dehu-
manisation of the out-group. States should be given dis-
cretion regarding how they meet their obligation to cre-
ate tolerant societies, not if.
6 Conclusion
Dehumanisation requires the categorisation of an out-
group as not human or less human than the in-group and
as a threat to the in-group. This serves to legitimise the
violation of the rights of the out-group. These rights
violations are not limited to hate speech, acts of discri-
mination and violations of identity rights but also
extend to the commission of mass atrocities. By adopt-
ing the lens of dehumanisation, this article has demon-
strated that if IHRL is to achieve its purpose, it is
imperative that all IHRL monitoring mechanisms seek
to address dehumanisation as a root cause of rights vio-
lations. To date, IHRL monitoring mechanisms have
insufficiently recognised that dehumanisation under-
mines the realisation of rights, particularly when dehu-
manisation is implicit or unconscious.
The insights provided by social psychology have
allowed this article to demonstrate how IHRL monitor-
ing mechanisms can interpret the pre-existing IHRL
framework to address dehumanisation through their
monitoring practice. Specifically, pre-existing positive
State obligations to prevent hate speech and foster toler-
ant societies, in theory, should be sufficient to counter
dehumanisation as a cause of rights violations. Signifi-
cantly, the AC-FCNM, CERD and HRC have clearly
elaborated the content of States’ positive obligation to
prevent hate speech and have struck a balance between
competing rights in this respect. However, the interpre-
tation of the positive State obligation to foster tolerant
societies requires strengthening and further elaboration
by all IHRL mechanisms if out-groups are to be pro-
tected from rights violations. This obligation is central
to challenging unconscious and implicit dehumanisation
as well as the societal conditions that allow dehumanisa-
tion to occur. IHRL mechanisms must require that
States not only educate their societies about out-groups
but also create opportunities for intercultural interac-
tions to take place, during which friendship and affec-
tive ties can be forged. The removal of structural barri-
ers is central to the success of these measures. Finally,
States must be required to create a positive public cul-
ture, which recognises out-groups as an integral part of
society. Significantly, all of these measures have a great-
er prospect of success if adopted to prevent rather than
counter dehumanisation.
The most detailed elaboration of the content of the posi-
tive State obligation to create tolerant societies has, per-
haps unsurprisingly, originated from targeted mechan-
isms. However, dehumanisation not only results in
discrimination and violations of identity rights but also
underpins serious and widespread rights violations,
including the commission of mass atrocities. Con-
sequently, the HRC and ECtHR must also engage with
the impact of dehumanisation on the realisation of rights
and require that States take measures to address dehu-
manisation, if absolute rights, such as the prohibition of
torture, are to be guaranteed.
If IHRL is to achieve its purpose and protect out-
groups from rights violations, IHRL monitoring
mechanisms must seek to strengthen States’ positive
obligation to create tolerant societies within their
respective frameworks and provide non-prescriptive
guidance regarding how this can be achieved in practice.
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